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Theorising negotiations with and across technological systems becomes imperative as people’s
lives are increasingly entwined with and enacted through technological devices and the
Internet. As these technologies become ubiquitous, the devices themselves may retain their
importance as valuable objects, but the underlying systems – hardware, software and processes
– that enable these devices to function become imperceptible. At the same time the idea of who,
or what, has control becomes convoluted and difficult to pin down, such that these
imperceptible systems are also considered immaterial: “of no matter,” unimportant or
inconsequential. At this level, technologies can be understood to have moved into the
background in their relations with humans, becoming, as Don Ihde says, “a kind of near-
technological environment” (108) or an “absent presence” (109 & 111). When operating
normally, such systems are often “barely detectable,” remaining broadly unnoticed in spite of
the fact that people may actually be required, or choose, to interact with them on a regular
basis, as is the case with Facebook, for example (Ihde 109). The resulting invisibility of these
systems reinforces their seeming immateriality, as their physical instantiation is forgotten
during everyday use, and they are judged to be not just inconsequential but also non-corporeal.
Ihde emphasises that background technologies are nonetheless able to “transform the gestalts of
human experience and, precisely because they are absent presences, may exert more subtle
indirect effects upon the way a world is experienced” (112). Indeed, as this paper explores,
technologies regarded by users as immaterial may suddenly reveal themselves and their
influence such that their power and consequence must be reassessed. In particular,
technological and philosophical interruptions can be identified as triggers for this process of re-
evaluation. In some cases, what was in a background relation to humans moves into the
foreground to become more clearly part of a “hermeneutic relation” by providing a
technological window onto the world. In other cases, technology moves into the position of an
“alterity relation,” recognised as an other with a level of agency and control (Ihde 72 & 80).
This paper analyses two examples: Facebook’s frictionless sharing initiative using Open Graph
and the Y2K or Millennium bug, positioning their effects as interruptions theorised from two
different perspectives. The first theoretical perspective is drawn from the terminology of the
interrupt or interruption as applied directly to computer processes by Simon Yuill, who asserts
that “The interrupt … is the mechanism through which the social, as a process of making and
breaking associations with others, is inscribed into a piece of running software” (163). This
theorisation positions the interrupt as functioning somewhat like the interruptions that occur
where discourse “is composed of sequences that are interrupted when the conversation moves
from partner to partner” (Blanchot 75). More marked interruptions also arise when the listener,
or even another person external to the conversation, cannot wait their turn and interjects, thus
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disrupting the flow of the speaker unexpectedly.
In addition to noting the importance of interruptions in moments of “saying,” Maurice
Blanchot also builds on Emmanuel Levinas’s defence of the irreducible distance retained
between self and other even in the proximity of an encounter. In extending this idea, Blanchot
draws out the second theoretical perspective considered by this paper, the “interruption of
being,” which protects the other from assimilation into the self, or fusion with the self to form a
unity, by highlighting the need to respect their alterity (69). This sense of interruption is used to
explore the revelation of a system, or piece of software, as an other, and therefore the
perception that it is an agent, capable of making decisions and performing actions whether for
itself or on behalf of a user.
Although evoking this philosophical understanding of interruption does position technology
and technological systems as “others,” this paper’s exploration of relations between humans
and technology does not adopt increasingly popular streams of thought such as object oriented
ontology (Harman), actor-network theory (Latour) or an alien phenomenological approach
(Bogost), all of which flatten ontological distinctions to regard people and technologies as
singular entities of equivalence in terms of agency and experiences. While this theoretical
impetus may translate in time to the world views and understandings of people in their
everyday relationships with technology, as yet these understandings largely do not appear to
have percolated through to the “person on the street.” Instead, the examples discussed in this
paper highlight the ways in which, experientially and perceptually, people generally do not see
objects and people as equivalent or as being open to being considered and treated equally:
people feel that they “use” technology, although their understanding of or communication with
these technologies may at times make them feel powerless as if the technology “uses” them (the
subject of many science fiction movies). It is this (sometimes) uneasy relationship which this
paper seeks to explore further.
The adoption of a phenomenological perspective has also been used to support the idea that
technologies (as phenomena) and people that encounter and use that technology have a co-
constitutive relationship. For example, Kittler’s argument is that forms of technology and
technological processes intersect with and influence humans, human actions and social
systems, affecting “our very ability to think critically about what ‘technology’ and the ‘human’
actually are” (Gane 39), and as a consequence interrupting or altering being. This type of
interruption is different from that identified by Blanchot and Levinas, since it is used to
highlight the ways that being is altered when it is mediated through technology, such that the
writer using a typewriter as opposed to a pen experiences changes to their physical actions and
mental processes as a result of the affordances or form of the technology, resulting in associated
differences in the produced text’s flow, structure and content. Bernard Stiegler makes a similar
claim when his reappraisal of the work of André Leroi-Gourhan results in the argument that
humans and technology “invent each other respectively” (142). In a recent book, Sarah Kember
and Joanna Zylinska take this idea further to suggest that media technologies and human
subjects can be understood to be mutually co-constituted in an “intertwined process of media
coproduction”, such that “life is mediation” (164). While not wishing to overlook the effects of
technology on being, and ideas of human and technologies co-constituting each other, this
paper concentrates instead on moments of interruption where the separations between humans
and technologies are drawn to attention.
For the purposes of this paper, the interrupt is also positioned as a useful heuristic to enable an
exploration of understandings of the immaterial – the intent of this special issue – and the
contextual specificity but also uncertainty that is expressed by this notion. As has already been
briefly explained, and will become more apparent through the following discussion, the
immaterial is understood herein in two ways. First, the term may be used to identify something
that is perceived as inconsequential or not mattering. In that sense, the immaterial is deemed
unimportant or at the very least unworthy of notice. The examples drawn upon in this paper
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use the notion of the interrupt to highlight moments when this lack of certainty or questions
about importance of entities, processes and categories become evident.
Second, the immaterial is linked to a perceived lack of corporeality, referring to things that
cannot be physically picked up, moved or handled. In this paper, the examples drawn upon
note the immateriality (in this sense) of software and computing signals in terms of their
inability to be physically engaged with. This understanding does not negate the oft-noted
material possibilities and outcomes of these phenomena/entities nor negate the very materiality
of their operation through the transmission of electronic signals, code and underpinning
hardware (Kittler). Indeed, the intention is not to overlook the possibilities offered by their
transformative potential: it is instead related to the first sense of immaterial, in terms of it being
perceived by most people (those who are not studying or working in a way that is directly
engaged with these systems) as invisible, ephemeral, somehow inaccessible or (when running
smoothly) as largely inconsequential. As Katherine Hayles notes, “There are all of these invisible
information flows surging around us of which we’re unconscious and unaware but that are
nevertheless becoming increasingly important in the technical infrastructural and the larger
picture of what’s going on” (30). The notions of the interrupt and interruption employed in the
paper are used to highlight shifts or moments when these understandings or experiences of the
immaterial are called into awareness or renegotiated.
According to Simon Yuill, the interrupt was one of two computing processes introduced in
conjunction with interactive computing. Interactive computing requires the computer processor
to be able to deal with incoming external signals (from systems and/or users) whilst running
multiple programs simultaneously which can be stopped, started and edited on command. This
type of interactive operation was in stark contrast with earlier batch processing models, where
single programs were run consecutively, without the ability to stop, edit, start or redirect the
process to work on a different task (Yuill 161). As a result of this need to manage multiple
signals and processes simultaneously, the interrupt was introduced.
The interrupt is the main mechanism through which an operating system seeks to
maintain a coherent environment for programs to run within, coordinating
everything external to the central processor, whether that be events in the outside
world, such as a user typing on a keyboard or moving a mouse, or things outside
the system’s internal coherence, such as a buffer overflow or an operational error in
a piece of software. … The interrupt not only creates a break in the temporal step-
by-step processing of an algorithm, but also creates an opening in its “operational
space.” (Yuill 161-162)
Therefore, the interrupt in computing terms offers a means for managing coherence amongst
entities, including humans, and processes, and also a way of enabling the introduction of,
recognition of, and communication between, different systems and processes.
An interrupt is a momentary signal or communication. Infrastructure and coding is required
for it to take place, its production may even rely on a hardware interface such as a keyboard,
but it has no perceivable physical corporeality in itself. An interrupt cannot be taken and
handled, moved or reconfigured except possibly through an alteration of the means by which it
is enacted. However, in spite of their apparent lack of physicality, interrupts play important
roles enabling a number of computing possibilities: they have agency in that they make things
happen, which in turn have consequences.
Facebook is an increasingly far-ranging system, which offers valuable examples of the relation
between the interrupt, interruption and ideas of seemingly immaterial, yet potentially
consequential, action. This is because the operation of Facebook as a Social Network Site (SNS)
is not only about allowing users to interact with the system and each other via various different
interfaces such as computers and mobile devices, but also about enabling interactions between
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systems themselves. This latter idea, of systems interacting on Facebook, became particularly
evident in 2011 when Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s Chief Executive Officer, launched the new
Timeline interface and a “completely new class of social apps” that, once installed, would
automatically share what users were reading, listening to or watching with their Facebook
friends (Bosker).
This new class of social app stood in contrast with the existing practice of adding “like” buttons
to external sites, such as news media sites and video sharing sites. Like buttons functioned in
such a way as to enable users to make an active decision to “like” a particular piece of online
content found outside of the SNS in order to share a link to that content on their Facebook
timeline. In contrast, some of the new apps changed the ways in which online content had
previously been shared through enabling what was described as frictionless, or seamless,
sharing using the new Open Graph framework. Once initially authorised, such apps would go
on to share everything that a user accessed in the linked media service such as Spotify, or read
on news sites such as The Washington Post (Darwell). In Yuill’s terms, sharing between systems
linked using this frictionless model was no longer driven by an interrupt directly caused by the
user clicking on or touching the “like” button or icon; rather, sharing had become wholly
reliant on software interactions. The material link between user and system, via the interface,
had been replaced by a software link, which, while supported by the material infrastructure of
the Internet, faded into the background to be regarded as immaterial. Frictionless sharing of
one’s actions with a service or on a website, via system raised interrupts, as opposed to the
user-triggered hardware interrupts, and the seamless transmission of information on Facebook
that it enabled, raised concerns as people wondered whether they really wanted to share all
they read, for example, with others, or indeed whether they really wanted to know what all
their friends had read.
In the world of frictionless sharing, it might be the user who had shared something they hardly
remembered even opening, let alone listening to, reading or watching, that might be most
interrupted by the realisation that a post had been made to their timeline by an app. However,
it is also worth noting that the reality of the sharing practices enabled by these new apps was
often less than seamless, initially at least. This was because when an app shared a link, it was
only those users who had already installed that app who could simply click through to the
source. Before sharing could become frictionless, the user had to be interrupted by a dialogue
box encouraging them to decide if they too (as their friend had) wanted to authorise the app to
monitor and share their actions on that site (Wood). Instead of the system being solely subject to
an interrupt, in this case the user is also interrupted as they attempt to read, listen to or watch
the content that had been shared on their friend’s behalf. As Yuill argues, in this case the
interrupt “makes software social … its performance dependent upon associations with others”
whether those others are “human users” or “other pieces of software” (162). Indeed, the user
may perceive this unexpected dialogue box as something akin to the app interrupting their
asynchronous social conversation with a friend. The seemingly immaterial code (of the app, or
of the service or website) draws attention to its existence and its desire to act on behalf of a new
user, if it is subsequently authorised. The operating and software codes underlying these
engagements – which may have been unnoticed, unconsidered and deemed unimportant or
inconsequential previously by the user – instead demand to be noticed and taken into account
through compelling a response. The technology moves from the background into the
foreground, and the user is required to acknowledge its existence, its importance, its
consequences and its actions. For some users, the foregrounded technology might be read as a
window onto their network of friends and the information they read and might share, accepted
as a useful hermeneutic connector. For other users, the technology might be understood as an
alterity, an agent that has gained (or wishes to gain) a level of control over what they share
with others.
In fact, Open Graph is perfectly able to suspend auto-sharing in order to support more regular
interruptions allowing users to confirm whether something that has been viewed should
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actually be shared in Facebook. In this case, instead of being frictionless, Open Graph enables
constant interruptions, allowing users the opportunity to decide if they really want to share a
particular piece of content on their timeline. Operating in this way, Open Graph is overtly
positioned in a hermeneutic relation with users, who are aware of its ability to help them
interact with their networks of Facebook friends. When providing regular interruptions, Open
Graph effectively enhances one’s awareness of the consequences of sharing each particular item
from a source system, via Facebook, with what is often a very varied set of Facebook friends.
Continual interruptions of this kind might be regarded as unwanted disruptions by some users
but, for many others, the opportunity to choose not to share something is seen as vital.
Unfortunately, Zuckerberg’s use of the word “frictionless” in the initial presentation about
Open Graph and Timeline, led application developers down the auto-sharing path, as opposed
to promoting a less seamless, and more regularly interrupted process, within which the system
and its code is less of an agent, and more of an enabler.
This example, of Facebook’s seamless sharing, links Yuill’s idea of the interrupt with a more
general idea about the interruptions that are a part of any dialogue. Drawing on Levinas’s
discussion of the encounter between self and other, Blanchot identifies the interruption as an
inherent part of any conversation, because the discourse between self and other “is composed
of sequences that are interrupted when the conversation moves from partner to partner” (75).
In this way, Blanchot highlights interruption as an essential part of turn-taking in dialogue,
although in a stronger sense there is always the possibility that the other might not wait their
turn, or indeed that a third party might interject. It is interruption in these terms that resonates
most strongly with Yuill’s discussion of the interrupt, whether the interrupt acts to make the
processor set aside its current thread in favour of a different one, or whether the interrupt
relates to a hardware trigger, such as a user pressing a key on the keyboard. In addition, this
sense of interruption in saying is also a productive way to understand the strength of
interruption experienced by a user expecting to read, for example, what has been shared via
their friend’s timeline, only to be taken to an unexpected dialogue asking them to register for an
app. The app interjects, as a third person might, interrupting the flow of communication
between user and friend in order to ask its question.
While what the interrupt in computing “is” is relevant for the discussion within this article, it is
also important to consider what the process draws attention to – simultaneously a disruption,
but also a means of introducing and recognising difference or alterity and the necessity of
negotiating with this difference in some way. This sense of disruption and recognition is found
in Blanchot’s identification of a more significant understanding of interruption based on
Levinas’s conception of “the face to face” encounter between self and other, within which the
communicators always remain clearly separated (Levinas 79-81). For Levinas, this separation is
not simply related to the physical distance between communicators; rather, it denotes the
presence of an insurmountable and valuable level of difference that continues to exist between
them even as they are brought into the proximity of the encounter. Blanchot extends Levinas’s
conception of the face to face when he describes a “relation of the third kind” for which
maintaining the difference between those involved is the essential characteristic (68). He
suggests that “what ‘founds’ this third relation … [is] the strangeness” that exists between the
communicators (68). Blanchot, argues that “it will not suffice to characterize” this difference as
Levinas does, “as a separation or even as a distance” (68); instead, it is better thought of as “an
interruption” (68), later termed “an interruption of being” (77). The self and other to which
Levinas and Blanchot refer are always human. However, Levinas’s description of the self-other
encounter as “the face to face,” defines the “face” not as a set of physical human features that
can be seen, but rather as encompassing all the ways in which the other chooses to reveal
themselves (79-81 & 262). Therefore, although this idea would have been alien to Levinas, this
paper stretches the notion of the face, and the otherness revealed in the face to face encounter,
so that it can consider the interruption of being that occurs when non-human entities, such as
the systems and apps discussed above, reveal their agency in encounters with humans.
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This conception would seem particularly helpful in analysing people’s deeper responses to the
apps that enabled frictionless sharing as occupying an alterity relation with users, and it is
appropriate to use Ihde’s terminology here, since his use of the word alterity was drawn from
Levinas’s philosophy. Although the moment when the app dialogue interjects, asking the user
to decide whether to allow this app access to their timeline, can be understood as an
interruption in a conversation, for some users it offered an important opportunity to recognise
the system and its agency as an untrusted other. The potential for automatic sharing, a feature
of many social music, video and news reading apps at the time when seamless sharing was first
introduced, made the initial moment to consider the act of authorising the app seem vital to
some users. When the app dialogue box, as opposed to the expected content, was reached, the
user’s engagement with their friend (as it initially appeared to them) was interrupted, and as a
result they were reminded of the presence not only of the technical interface, but also the raft of
potential other interested parties that might be involved in this encounter and the possible
consequences that might result. Thus the user was called upon – by a message auto-generated
by the underlying technical system – to pause their course of action and to reflect and consider
whether they wished to continue. The interruption of the dialogue box during the
communicative act draws the user’s attention to the presence of previously unnoticed,
seemingly immaterial processes and their possible consequences: the multiple layers of data
collection, commercial interests and potential privacy implications.
The conception of an interruption in being can be further drawn out by considering the sudden
recognition of a computer system, and the consequence of interacting with it for human users,
during the run up to Y2K. In some ways, this second example, of Y2K or the Millennium bug, is
a more extreme illustration of a realisation, or a bringing into the foreground, of our
relationships with technology throughout the everyday and the extent of our reliance on them,
than the Facebook example already discussed.
Y2K, or the Millennium bug as it was variously referred, was the result of programming
decisions that had been made where year dates were stored using only the last two digits rather
than all four. Consequently, the impending turn of the century would have caused these
systems to represent the year 2000 as “00,” causing potentially dramatic processing
interpretations as a result (see Li, Williams and Bogle for an overview). Apocalyptic visions of
planes falling out of the sky, cars losing control on the road or more mundane notions that
toasters or refrigerators might stop working, or credit cards be declined, were rife throughout
the press, in academia and in everyday conversations on the street (see Poulsen for some
particularly dire scenario predictions). Indeed, according to Li et al., “It has been predicted that
many patients will die (it was estimated that half of the equipment in NHS hospitals could not
cope with the date change!). Traffic will grind to a halt because some traffic lights and air
traffic control systems will fail” (6). People were unsure about what devices contained
potentially affected technologies (micro-chip processors) and what did not. In essence, people
were encouraged to notice the potential otherness of the gadgets and larger machines that they
took for granted as part of their everyday lives. They were afraid that these technologies would
interrupt their lives, in what might even be harmful or deadly ways. However, although the
most serious implications discussed were most often physical in nature, for example aeroplanes
falling from the sky, the otherness that was being revealed was actually strongly linked not
with the material, but with the unpredictability of and lack of control over the internal
programming of these objects. The relevance of a failure in a seemingly immaterial system was
perhaps even clearer when considering the disruption expected in monetary and trading
systems, offering the potential effectively to interrupt the world economy.
In terms of the more philosophical notion of interruption that we are exploring, Y2K caused the
potential for interruptions of being in particular – because much of the hype was about
drawing attention to the unknowability or alterity, and therefore the potential loss of control, of
the system. Underlying the sense of otherness that people recognised within objects ranging
from planes to toasters, and systems involved in running anything from trading markets to
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applications on their own home computer, however, is still the question of code and process-
level interrupts. A return to Yuill’s understanding of the interrupt therefore highlights that the
issues being discussed around Y2K, both large and small, were still closely linked with the idea
of unexpected errors being raised. The “00” dates were “dangerous” because they might be
misunderstood. They might raise “unhandled” errors, likely to result in system interrupts that
were not gracefully incorporated into a set of controlled changes to the processing path, and
which might therefore lead to small glitches, or partial or even complete system failures.
In reality though, it did prove possible to cater for most of these possibilities by reprogramming.
In some cases, the expectation of difficulty was overhyped, since only code dealing directly
with dates was likely to be badly affected. Through a combination of pre-emptive action and
less dire consequences at times than anticipated, the millennium bug had far fewer dramatic
effects than people expected. Nevertheless, it caused a period of global uncertainty, costing
businesses many billions in risk assessment, remedial management and system testing. People’s
fears and lack of certainty in the reliability of their technological counterparts and their once
thought immaterial systems also led to modifications in immediate personal courses of action:
the cancellation of air flights and holidays, for example, as well as changes in individual
behaviours more generally for at least a day and in some cases more extensively.
The Y2K and Facebook examples are both interesting not only because of the potential
interruptions in technology and human activity that were suggested, but also for the ways
these interruptions brought the presence of technology, technological systems and processes
involved in the everyday to people’s attention; changed behaviours and practices; and caused
them to question the place of these technologies in their lives, particularly their reliance upon
them. In varied ways, people were called on to recognise and acknowledge the
interdependence of human and technology as part of a broader operating system. As Lewis
clarifies in relation to Y2K, “Whatever the effects over the coming months on the world
economy, and on the convenience of our daily lives, the reputation of computer systems will be
transformed” (196).
In terms of the Millennium situation, for example, the lack of foresight inscribed in the decision
to use only two figure years in dates, in part possibly driven by the way that the hardware of
computers at that time was constrained in size (memory) and power (processing) was
overlooked for many years, only becoming recognised, in a sense becoming material (although
it always had been material, just not understood as such), when the year 2000 loomed. In
contrast, the negative response to the Open Graph architecture was more indicative of a
mismatch between the desire of Facebook, or maybe more clearly of Zuckerberg himself, to
encourage people to share everything that they did, and those of the Facebook users, who
preferred to share information with particular people selectively as opposed to with all
“friends” or publicly.
In both of the examples discussed in this paper, people were forced to interrupt what they were
doing, to address the possible material consequences of processes that had previously been
ignored, or thought to be immaterial, not just in the sense of being black boxes of code, but also
in the sense of their being inconsequential when working smoothly. People were asked to
engage with technologies in a way that recognised and acknowledged them as other, no longer
reliably under control, or at the least potentially about to be inoperable, resulting in a need to
modify their practices as a result. In the sense that things that are immaterial are understood to
be inconsequential, the interruptions discussed above also mark moments when an immaterial
action is instead quite clearly of consequence and merits further consideration. This paper’s
argument draws attention to the way that almost anything might be regarded as immaterial, at
least for a time, such that a technology’s immateriality, for example, is a temporary perceptual
state supported by its move into the background instead of being foregrounded in everyday
relations with people. The immateriality of technological systems is thus linked with their
perceived salience, while technical interrupts or philosophical interruptions offer various ways
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in which that salience may be re-established or brought to the fore and acknowledged.
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